How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.
Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel
for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made
to conceive it in a very lively manner.
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others,
is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances
to prove it; for this sentiment,like all the other original
passions of human nature, is by no means confined
to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel
it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
The opening of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments:
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